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Abstract
We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO
Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions.
First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Set-
tlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda{
setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make trade
restrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the
system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to de-
lay negative ¯ndings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy
in ¯ghting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially
reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are
more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected out-
come of the formal dispute settlement procedure. Empirical evidence based on a ¯rst
data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative
support for our claims.
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11 Introduction
Don't let the European Union make a game of the WTO system1
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has celebrated its ¯fth anniversary on January
1, 2000. This was overshadowed by the failure of the Third WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Seattle and two big | though not necessarily representative | agricultural trade
disputes between the US and the EU, which have caught most of the public's attention
concerning the WTO in recent months. Unfortunately, one of its most important fea-
tures, the new Dispute Settlement System, has not attracted the attention it deserves.
Although the well{known \banana" and the \hormones" cases have indeed uncovered
potential weaknesses of the litigation mechanism, a substantial number of disputes have
gone through the process successfully, but largely unnoticed by both the public and the
economic profession. Our paper attempts a ¯rst systematic description of the mechanism
from an economic perspective. We do analyze the WTO Dispute Settlement System as a
game and confront the predictions of the theoretical model with the empirical evidence
from its ¯rst ¯ve years.
The WTO's predecessor GATT (General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade) was suc-
cessful in reducing tari®s, but su®ered from increasing problems with non{tari® restric-
tions and from a weak and intransparent mechanism to deal with trade disputes. As
a consequence, the new WTO established a mandatory and uni¯ed dispute settlement
system with much broader jurisdiction. During its ¯rst ¯ve years a large number of cases
made this institution by far the most active part of the new international trade orga-
nization. WTO and GATT dispute settlement systems have been studied by political
scientists and legal experts,2 but we are not aware of any other economic explanation of
1Washington Post, December 1998. This and other advertisements (\If it's going to have any teeth, the
World Trade Organization has to cut them on beef and bananas.") refer to the two prominent agricultural
con°icts (DS16/27 and DS26/48, see Table 4) between the US and the EU, and have appeared in major US
newspapers in 1998. In both cases, the WTO decided in favor of the US (the complainant) and requested
the EU (the defendant) to change its practice within a period of 15 months. The EU failed to implement
the recommendations of the dispute settlement system, and the US subsequently got permission to levy
retaliation tari®s on EU products.
2See for example Croley & Jackson (1995) and Vermulst & Driessen (1995). A more general perspective
on trade legalism is taken by Shell (1995). For a statistical analysis of GATT disputes see Hudec, Kennedy
and Sgarbossa (1993). While focusing on legal aspects, Jackson (1998) provides interesting information
on motives and strategies of litigating parties. Petersmann (1997) contains a detailed analysis of the
WTO dispute settlement system and its predecessors from a predominantly legal perspective. This book
also comprises a large number of illustrating examples, predominantly under GATT.
2the parties' incentives and strategies during the dispute settlement process. Our contribu-
tion tries to ¯ll this gap by providing a more formal economic analysis of the mechanism.
The WTO's trade litigation procedures di®er not only from dispute handling within
the old GATT, but in fact from any previous dispute settlement mechanisms at an inter-
national level. Any member country which feels negatively a®ected by another country's
trade measure can bring a case before the dispute settlement system and is granted
agenda{setting capacity for a large part of the dispute. Unless a bilateral settlement is
reached between the countries involved, the case is decided by a panel established by
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The panel's verdict can subsequently be appealed
by either country. If the report is in favor of the complainant, the defendant country is
given a limited period to implement the panel's or appellate body's recommendations.
In case of the defendant's non{compliance after the granted implementation period, the
complainant has a right to ask for compensatory trade concessions. An important di®er-
ence to dispute settlement under GATT is the elimination of a (factual) unanimity rule.
As a consequence, the WTO dispute settlement system prevents single members from
blocking the adoption of the ¯nal and binding decision.
The new rules seem e®ective in practice. Already a casual inspection of (nearly)
completed cases o®ers some striking empirical regularities. The ¯rst fact is the large
number of cases which have been brought forward to formal dispute settlement. 185
complaints in ¯ve years contrast with less than 300 cases in GATT's 47{year history.
The large number of cases put forward could be a consequence of the system's inability
to prevent trade restrictions or nuisance suits, but could also represent a higher con¯dence
of negatively a®ected countries in an improved mechanism. The second observation is
the apparent popularity of the appellate review. In only 4 cases was the panel report
the last instance of the litigation, whereas 24 panel reports were subsequently appealed.3
The high proportion of appeals does not seem consistent with the appellate review being
an additional legal safeguard only. A third observation which deserves further analysis is
the mixed success of the system's implementation mechanism. Whether non{compliance
is an inherent danger of the system's structure, as the two big agricultural disputes may
suggest, is yet an open question. It is clear, however, that a successful implementation
stage feeds back into a more powerful procedure. A fourth and last observation is the
relatively high ratio of bilateral settlements prior to a panel decision.
Our paper attempts to cast some light on these issues. In particular, it aims to answer
3These numbers do not include cases for which the granted period to appeal had not elapsed by
December 31, 1999. Most cases, however, are still at a preliminary stage of the litigation process.
3the following questions:
1. Can the WTO dispute settlement system preclude trade restrictions and nuisance
suits?
2. What are the reasons and incentives of the (losing) country to appeal a panel
¯nding? Does the appellate review in practice really play a strictly legal role?
3. How well can WTO rulings and recommendations be enforced given the incentives
of the litigants?
4. When are bilateral settlements more likely, and what form might they take? Should
they be encouraged by the WTO as they currently are, or rather not?
The importance of strategic interaction between the countries during litigation can be
captured by a dynamic game with a succession of sequential moves of the involved players.
Time is an important determinant of both parties' payo®s, because rents and cost accrue
during the whole litigation process. In the course of the procedure, the appearance
of new information and joining third parties, moreover, can change the outcome of the
game. Modeling the multistage setting and the rather complicatedstructure of the system
poses a number of di±cult questions. The focus of our paper clearly lies on ¯nding an
appropriate way to map the system into a tractable dynamic game which preserves the
most important features, rather than on applying sophisticated game theoretic methods.
Although we take an economist's perspective, legal and political aspects are taken into
account via their impact on the parties' payo® structure.
Civil suits and international disputes share a number of common features, but di®er
considerably in other respects.4 As the most important di®erence, the payo®s of parties
in international litigation accrue predominantly in a non{pecuniary way in the form of
political rents and as reputation e®ects. In most instances, therefore, the issue is not a
zero{sum game. Due to the limited number of countries in the organization, moreover,
the players' characteristics are supposedly well known. Imperfect information within the
dispute settlement system is therefore only of secondary importance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the new dispute settlement
mechanism in more detail and highlights its most important di®erences compared to
GATT. Section 3 introduces the structure of the game. The core of the paper, section 4,
4The existing literature on the economic analysis of legal disputes is predominantly concerned with
civil suits. An excellent review of this literature can be found in Cooter & Rubinfeld (1989).
4analyses the outcomes of the game. The model's predictions at di®erent stages of the liti-
gation process are compared with a preliminary data set of completed or nearly completed
cases. Section 5 provides a summary of the most important ¯ndings and concludes.
2 Dispute settlement under GATT and WTO
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism involves a number of stages, the most important
of which are illustrated in Figure 1, and by a typical completed case | a complaint by
Venezuela against US about standards for gasoline | in Appendix B.5 Obviously, the
reason for the procedure, and therefore the ¯rst stage of the litigation procedure, is a
trade related measure of country D (the future defendant), which seemingly violates WTO
law and nulli¯es or impairs the bene¯t of another country C (the future complainant).
While most cases within the WTO dispute settlement system have dealt with preexisting
measures, this ¯rst step must not be neglected, should the role of the dispute settlement
be analyzed for future cases. Ideally, the WTO should prevent countries from taking
measures incompatible with WTO law in the ¯rst place.
If no bilateral settlement between the two parties can be reached outside WTO proce-
dures, the complainant country C can notify the WTO that it is asking for consultations
under the dispute settlement system. This step brings the case to public attention and
might attract other countries with similar problems with country D. Countries with a
genuine interest into the case can be formally included as third parties in the dispute.
Should no agreement be reached after 60 days, the complainant can request the estab-
lishment of a panel, which will usually be granted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) after at most 30 days.
The panel stage, which under normal conditions should not exceed six months, follows
a number of intermediate steps and involves both parties. In a careful fact{¯nding
process, the positions of both countries are reviewed. An important step during the
panel stage is the interim report, which includes all relevant panel ¯ndings and can be
viewed as a ¯nal draft of the panel's verdict. Revealing the position the panel will take on
this particular case, it is thus an important source of information for both parties. The
interim report should remain con¯dential to the parties involved6 and give them a last
5A comprehensive description of the dispute settlement system and a wealth of additional information,
including panel and appellate review reports, can also be found in WTO (1995) and on WTO's webpage
(www.wto.org/wto/dispute).
6Often, however, this principle has been violated in the past, notably by the winner in bigger cases,
5opportunity to settle their dispute bilaterally. If no bilateral settlement can be reached,
the ¯nal panel report, which includes recommendations for implementation, is circulated
among all WTO members.
As a novel feature of trade litigation, the WTO dispute settlement system provides
an appellate review by a standing appellate body composed of seven independent legal
experts. This second | and last | instance should provide an additional safeguard
against legally wrong panel decisions. Both involved parties can appeal against legal
or procedural aspects of the panel decision. The introduction of the possibility of an
appellate review as a second instance is considered to be one of the main new features
of the system compared to GATT proceedings. The appellate body has a strictly legal
function, such that substantive issues | in principle | cannot be raised during this
stage.7
Should the binding decision of either the panel or the appellate review be in favor of
the complainant, the defendant is given a \reasonable period" (typically not to exceed 15
months) of time to bring the respective trade regulation into conformity with WTO law.
In case of disagreement the period is determined by an independent arbitrator. If the
defendant does not conform with the panel's recommendations, compensatory measures
can be taken by the complainant. In a ¯rst step, the complainant can force the defendant
to enter a bargaining process regarding compensatory trade concessions. If the parties do
not come to an agreement within 20 days, the complainant is granted the right to take
countervailing measures, which have to satisfy certain conditions. Among others, the
volume of the retaliation measures must not exceed the complainant's incurred damage.
Although both compensations and retaliation measures are supposed to be temporary, it
is unclear what happens if the defendant refuses to implement the recommendations of
the panel despite countervailing measures.
Between any of these formal stages, bilateral negotiations can take place. Failure to
reach a bilateral agreement is a necessary prerequisite for the next step. It usually su±ces
to notify the WTO about a successful mutual agreement. The outcomes of bilateral sett-
lements are not monitored by the WTO, and their contents are usually not disclosed.
The major di®erences between the WTO structure and dispute settlement under
most recently by the EU in the FSC dispute with the US (DS108).
7However, limiting the permissible subject matter of the appeal is presumably di±cult. Petersmann
(1997, page 190) writes: \Experience with domestic and international appellate review proceedings con-
¯rms that distinguishing law from fact, and de¯ning the limits of legal arguments, are notoriously di±-
cult."
6GATT can be summarized as follows: First, the WTO o®ers a uni¯ed dispute settlement
system for trade disputes under all WTO Agreements, whereas GATT comprised at least
eight di®erent structures for dealing with trade disputes, depending on the nature of the
trade restriction. This feature of GATT induced parties to use forum shopping in order
to ¯nd the most favorable environment. Second, the complainant has now a right to have
a panel process initiated. Unlike under GATT's factual unanimity rule, there is no way
for the defendant to block formal litigation at this stage. In fact, within some limits,
the complainant is granted agenda setting power during the whole litigation process.
Third, both parties can appeal against the panel decision. Fourth, the adoption of the
¯nal decision (either the panel or the appellate body report) within the WTO dispute
settlement system can no longer be vetoed by the losing defendant, as under the old
GATT. Finally, the implementation phase has been given more structure. If the losing
country does not conform with the panel's recommendations, the complainant has the
right to ask for compensation or to take countervailing measures.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Figure 1 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 The theoretical model
Our goal is to arrive at a tractable model of the WTOdispute settlement procedure, which
nonetheless captures the most important features of the system. The rest of the litigation
process is summarized in an appropriate way. We ¯rst introduce the participating players
and the main stages of the game. The players' payo® structures and the underlying
information set are discussed next.
3.1 Players
The WTO dispute settlement system has two genuine players: The defendant D is the
country which has taken an action (trade restriction) and which is subsequently accused
of violating WTO law by the complainant C who ¯les the suit. Both countries are
represented by their governments, whose interests are not necessarily identical to those of
their population. Throughout the analysis, we assume risk neutral players and therefore
linear utility.8
8By postulating linear utility, computations of expected payo®s are kept transparent, even when the
dispute stretches over several periods. Moreover, we do not have to specify any distributional assumptions
7Unlike many private litigation processes, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
allows third parties to participate in the process. Moreover, new information might turn
up during the litigation. In our analysis any new relevant information and the appearance
of additional countries are summarized in a change in either the litigation costs or in the
probability of a certain outcome of both the panel and the appeal decision.
3.2 Stages of the game and timing of actions
Two kinds of stages are distinguished: First, there are well de¯ned stages during which
one of the two country{players or WTO makes a move. Second, there are some inter-
mediate stages in which bargaining between the two countries can take place. The main
stages in the former category are illustrated in Figure 2: In a ¯rst step (1) the defendant
introduces a trade related measure. This can also mean that a preexisting | and previ-
ously undisputed | measure can suddenly fall under scrutiny of other countries, notably
after a change in WTO law. The next two steps | noti¯cation of WTO (2) and panel
request (3) | are taken by the complainant and initiate the o±cial WTO procedure.
The most important step during the panel phase clearly is the interim report (move (4)
by the WTO). This is the ¯rst time during the process, when the involved parties know
the position of the panel. Both parties can appeal against the panel decision (5). The
succession of moves (or simultaneous moves) is not speci¯ed here. The appellate review
(6) is the ¯nal decision by the WTO. The ¯ndings of the interim/panel report can be
recon¯rmed or revised. To simplify matters we summarize the implementation stage as
a single step (7). Between any of the above stages, bilateral negotiations can take place.
The failure of reaching a bilateral agreement is a necessary prerequisite for the next step,
and a successful bilateral settlement ends the game at any stage.
We assume that the decisions of the WTO dispute settlement system are unequivocal,
either in favor of the defendant or in favor of the complainant. Precluding the possibility
of \intermediate" decisions, we thus merely have to state the resulting payo®s in either
case.
3.3 Payo® structure
We distinguish three categories of relevant payo® components (as summarized in Table 1):
Directly trade related gains and losses, reputation gains and losses, and litigation costs.
about random components of the payo® structure.
8Trade related gains and losses may represent welfare gains and losses to a country,
but very often are rents and costs accruing to certain interest groups, which directly
translate into an implicit political support function. For simplicity, it is assumed that
trade related payo®s are proportional to the time the trade measure is inaction. Note that
| unlike in most civil suits | gains and losses are not symmetric. The game is therefore
not a zero{sum{game, even in the absence of reputation costs. If the gains accrue to
powerful lobby groups, for example, a trade restriction might well lead to a gain for the
defendant in political support which exceeds the complainant's loss.9 To capture the
impact of the duration of the litigation on payo®s, we make a distinction between rents
during the process and continuation rents after the conclusion of the litigation process.
During the dispute settlement procedure, the bene¯t rate for the defendant is denoted
by g, and the loss rate for the complainant by l.10 To simplify the analysis, we refrain
from discounting bene¯ts and losses during the length of the dispute. Continuation rents
and losses, denoted by ~ G and ~ L respectively, accrue after completion of the litigation
process. We assume that they are ¯nite due to discounting or due to the fact that
new technologies or other changing circumstances might render a previously bene¯cial or
harmful trade restriction irrelevant. A last trade related payo® is the loss pD (given as
a rate) incurred by a non{complying defendant via the complainant's retaliation policies
during implementation stage.
Reputation gains and losses are assumed to occur at certain stages of the litigation
process. The importance of these payo® elements is emphasized especially by political
and legal scientists (see for example Jackson (1998)). Reputation payo®s depend on
the nature and size of the dispute, as well as on a country's size and political structure
(i.e. the importance of interest groups, reelection procedures). With one exception they
are modeled here as one{time gains and costs: Reputation gains/losses for the com-





lose), respectively.11 For simplicity, we assume that they only
9The U.S. Treasury Department, for example, estimates that the current U.S. FSC regime (DS108,
see Table 4) generates $2{3 billion in permanent tax savings to U.S. exporters annually. Despite these
revenue losses, the US government strongly defends this measure, backed by a powerful lobby of exporters.
10For a period of time t (given as a fraction of one year), trade related gains and losses are consequently
gt and lt.
11The eagerness of countries to advertise victory or to explain a defeat is obvious from various media
reports. In a press statement, the European Union writes: \Until now, there have been only two rul-
ings that have found that certain EU measures are incompatible with WTO provisions. These are the
Hormones and Banana cases. It should be remembered that these cases have a long history and involve
9occur during the panel stage and are therefore adjusted for the probability that the sub-
sequent appellate review yields a di®erent outcome. By undergoing the appellate review
stage after a negative panel ¯nding, the losing government can signal its determinacy
to act in the interest of the involved domestic groups, realizing a reputation gain RC
app
(RD
app). Note that for the defendant country, the appellate stage is the ¯rst and only stage
in which it can actively in°uence the process.12 Reputation costs of non{compliance with
the DSB's ¯ndings are assumed to increase with time and are denoted by RD
impl[t] (i.e.
d(RD
impl[t])=dt ¸ 0) . The fact that the US, but also other countries, complied even in
the absence of explicit implementation procedures under GATT in a number of cases
provides some support for the existence of these reputation costs.13 Their structure will
depend on the nature of the con°ict.
Litigation costs | i.e. legal and organizational costs of undergoing the dispute settle-
ment system | are denoted by KC (KD). For simplicity, we assume that litigation costs
only matter for the panel stage. They should be interpreted as net additional costs of
formal litigation over mutual agreement. The entrance of third parties into the dispute
can thus a®ect the process costs directly (sharing of legal fees) or indirectly (higher
coordination costs for cooperating countries in bilateral settlements).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Table 1 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3.4 Information set and probability structure
The analysis assumes a game under uncertainty, in which the outcomes of the settle-
ment procedure are not known in advance. The probability of the WTO (panel) deciding
in favor of the complainant is denoted by ¼. The revision probabilities of a potential
appellate review are given by ¹ (= probability of appellate review in favor of defendant,
other considerations than trade, such as public health and development assistance." (EU information on
the web (Oct. 98)). Concerning the lost US ¯lm case (DS44, see Table 4), the New York Law Journal
(February 26, 1998) cites the dean of Brooklyn Law School by \the loss was small in comparison to other
victories the US has been setting so far".
12Especially in the EU and the US the actions of the governments are closely monitored by the involved
interest groups. As the headline of its press release Greenpeace stated: \Greenpeace applauds EU appeal
against WTO beef{hormone ruling", Brussels (September 97).
13Jackson (1998, page 170) argues that \even the most powerful trading entities in the world ¯nd it
di±cult diplomatically to ignore the results of the dispute settlement process, although in some sense,
they could get away with it."
10after a panel report in favor of the complainant) and º (= probability of appellate review
in favor of complainant, after a panel report in favor of the defendant). An additional
restriction is imposed on the probabilities ¹ and º, which allows us to abstract from
revision probabilities later in the analysis. We require that the probability ¼ that the
panel rules in favor of the complainant equals the overall probability of success for the
complainant:14
¼ = ¼(1 ¡¹)+ (1¡ ¼)º (1)
We assume symmetric information about all rents. In the context of the WTO dispute
settlement, it can be expected that gains and losses from trade restrictions are public
knowledge. The same is true, possibly to a lesser extent, of litigation costs and reputation
gains and losses. Under symmetric/complete information, both players have identical
beliefs at each stage of the game.
Probabilities and payo® elements are not restricted to remain constant during the
game. Apart from WTO's decisions, random draws between noti¯cation and the interim
report may change the information and cost structure of the game. The probability of
a certain outcome is itself random. However, we assume that the best predictor of each
payo® component X is always the current value of X,15 therefore E(t)X(t +s) = X(t),
8s ¸ 0. Random changes are assumed to be uncorrelated. Consequently, we do not have
to specify the probability distribution of the payo® components (or of probabilities) in a
risk{neutral setting with linear preferences.
The recent Foreign Sales Corporations case (FSC, DS108) between the EU and the
US provides a nice illustration for time{dependent payo®s. As will be predicted by
our theoretical model below, the US appealed against the negative rulings of the panel.
Shortly afterwards, it withdrew the appeal conditional on its right to ¯le a new notice of
appeal later on. Most probably the US, hosting of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference
in Seattle, did not want to be seen as a non{complying country. After the conference,
when public attention was beginning to fade away, the US did indeed renew its appeal.
Apparently, the US experienced a temporary change in its reputation costs.
14As a numerical example, consider a situation in which the complainant has a high probability ¼ = 0:9
to win. For ¹ = 0:1, condition (1) dictates that º = 0:9, i.e. that the probability of a revision in favor of
the complainant after a negative panel ¯nding is rather high. For ¼ = 0, which corresponds to an empty
threat of the complainant, º = 0 and ¹ can take any value. Similarly for ¼ = 1, which corresponds to a
clear violation of WTO law, ¹ = 0 and º is unspeci¯ed.
15Note that probabilities (but not payo®s) are restricted to lie in the interval [0;1]. Consequently, there
is a probability mass one at both ¼ = 1 and ¼ = 0. This means that once a case is clear, it will stay so
forever with probability one.
11- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Figure 2 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 Theoretical predictions and empirical evidence
The game tree is drawn in its extensive form in Figure 2. Taking into account the
limited information available on the implementation stage, a simpli¯ed treatment will be
proposed below. The model is solved backwards to obtain subgame perfect equilibria.
Following the solution path, we present the predictions for the implementation stage
¯rst, and proceed with an analysis of the appeal stage. The complainant's optimal
strategy before the panel and its ¯ling decision are considered next. Finally, we analyze
the future defendant's decision to introduce a trade measure. A summary of predicted
subgame perfect equilibria and the number of cases corresponding to them can also be
found in Table 3.
In the ¯rst part of this section, bilateral settlements are ignored, i.e. the results are
stated as if there was no scope for mutual agreements. A ¯rst reason is the very limited
information available about the nature of bilateral agreements. It is generally unknown
whether a bilateral settlement involves a reduction of the disputed trade measure or
compensatory trade restrictions by the complainant. Second, compensation payments |
an important ingredient in civil suits | hardly exist between litigating countries. The
highly non{pecuniary nature of most payo® components makes it di±cult to compare
the \cooperative value" of a settlement with the \non{cooperative value" of pursuing
the dispute. The possibility of bilateral settlements is therefore analyzed separately in
the second part of this section.
Each prediction from our model is illustrated with some empirical evidence from
WTO dispute settlement complaints ¯led during the ¯rst ¯ve years. This analysis rests
on a preliminary database prepared by the authors which comprises relevant information
on all complaints ¯led during this ¯ve year period. Unfortunately, only a fraction of all
¯led suits have been concluded so far, and the vast majority are still at a preliminary
stage of the litigation process. Nonetheless, the existing evidence should facilitate an
assessment of the predictive power and potential shortcomings of our theoretical model.
For easy reference, all cases mentioned explicitly in this paper are numbered by their
o±cial WTO label, and are listed in Table 4 of Appendix C.
124.1 The implementation stage
After a negative panel or appellate review ruling, the losing defendant is granted a \rea-
sonable implementation period" ¿. Although negotiations about compensatory conces-
sions can be requested and retaliation measures can be taken in case of the defendant's
non{compliance, the role of the complainant is rather passive. Its only choice variable is
thus the time ~ ¿ ¸ ¿ after which it can ask for retaliation.16.
The optimal strategies of both players during implementation stage can be summa-
rized in prediction 1.
Prediction 1 (Implementation): The defendant conforms with WTO rulings, if and
only if





where I[t¸~ ¿] is the indicator function. Consequently:
² The optimal strategy of the complainant is to request compensation or retali-
ation immediately after the completion of the granted implementation period,
thus ~ ¿ = ¿.
² Given the expected strategy of the complainant, the three possible implementa-
tion dates are as follows:
{ At the beginning of the implementation period (t = 0), if the reputation
costs for non{conforming with WTO law are greater than the trade gains.
{ At the end of the granted implementation period (t = ¿), if the impact of




{ At a time ~ t ￿ 1 strictly greater than ¿ for which
d(RD
impl[t])
dt jt=~ t = g ¡pD).
Proof: Note that instantaneous trade related gains g and lossed due to retaliation pD




Even if compensation payments are granted by the defendant or if retaliation measures
16We view compensatory concessions and retaliations as a combined means to punish a non{conforming
defendant
17For linear reputation costs, for example, RD
impl[t] = ½t, the three possible implementation equilibria
are t
¤
impl = 0, t
¤
impl = ¿, and t
¤
impl = 1. For exponential reputation costs the defendant always implements
after a ¯nite time period: A non{conforming defendant is stigmatized quickly enough to prevent an in¯nite
delay of implementation.
13o®set part of the incurred loss of the defendant's trade restriction, the complainant
is unanimously better o® by a direct implementation of the panel's recommendation.
Recall that the trade value of the retaliation measures must not exceed the trade value
of incurred losses and the complainant gets no retroactive remedy. Taking into account
the fact that the defendant has a strong incentive to delay implementation, the optimal
strategy of the complainant country is to request compensation or retaliation as soon as
possible.
By the end of 1999, our database contains 11 cases for which information on the
implementation status is available. The remaining cases with a ¯nal report in favor
of the complainant are still within the \reasonable implementation period" granted by
the system. While the number of cases is too small to draw reliable conclusions, the
clustering of implementation periods, as predicted by our model, is obvious. We can
distinguish three di®erent patterns of implementation behavior so far. Two cases ended
with an immediate adoption of the panel's or appellate review's recommendations. Both
involved relatively minor complaints against the US in which the direct gains for US
interest groups can be presumed to be small relative to reputation losses in delaying
implementation (DS24 and DS33).18
In seven cases (involving seven di®erent defendants),19 the losing defendant imple-
mented the panel's ¯nding shortly after the \reasonable implementation period" had
elapsed, in most cases after 15 months. Once a reasonable period has been speci¯ed
(either in the ¯nal report or by an arbitrator), none of the countries has an incentive to
conform before, and the prospect of retaliation measures may have triggered implemen-
tation. The a®ected trade volumes in the seven disputes seem to be in an intermediate
range.
In two major agricultural trade disputes between the US as a complainant and the
EU as the defendant (DS16/27 and DS26/48), the panel's recommendations were not
(fully) implemented even after the period determined by the arbitrator. In both cases
the US asked for, and was granted, compensatory measures immediately after the given
18In the latter case, the US conformed with the panel's recommendations even before the ¯nal appellate
review report was adopted. The appeal was actually asked by the complainant to get clari¯cations on
legal, but not substantive issues. (See also the section on the appellate review below.)
19The cases are DS2/4 (defendant US), DS8/10/11 (Japan), DS31 (Canada), DS50 (India),
DS54/55/59/64 (Indonesia), DS56 (Argentina), and DS69 (EU). Complaint DS2/4 is also illustrated
in Appendix C. The implementation of four further ruling (DS18, DS46, DS70, and DS58) are scheduled
to be evaluated by the original panel because there is considerable disagreement between the litigants
about the implementation status after the implementation period had elapsed.
14implementation period had been elapsed. In both cases, available evidence suggests that
the political gain for the EU to retain the disputed trade restrictions are high (for public
health concerns (\hormones") and the treatment of former colonies (\bananas")).
For the remainder of the analysis, it is assumed that the defendant implements after
a period timpl = ¿, before compensating measures are taken. Any other equilibrium, in
particular if the defendant does not comply with a probability °, can be modeled in an
analogous way.
4.2 The appeal stage
An appeal by one of the parties su±ces to have the issue in question reviewed by the
appellate body. \Appellate review" is the equilibrium of the game as long as the ex-
pected payo®s for \appeal" are higher than \not appeal" for one litigant.20 The optimal
strategies of the players are as follows.
Prediction 2 (appellate review): A losing defendant appeals even if the chance of a
reversal of the panel's ¯ndings ¹ is zero. A losing complainant appeals if either
reputation gains RC
app or the reversal probability º are strictly greater than zero.
Proof: The claim is easily veri¯ed by inspecting the relevant payo®s of the game (see
section A.1 in the Appendix)
There is an overwhelming incentive for the losing government to appeal against the
panel report. Consider for example the case of the losing defendant. There are three
reasons for our prediction: First and most important, the negative panel ¯nding and
consequently implementation can be delayed at least for a certain period of time, resulting
in an additional trade related rent. Second, the government may secure political support
from involved interest groups. Especially for sensitive issues, as for example the EU
\hormones" and \banana" cases, domestic political pressure to appeal is substantial.
Finally, there is a small probability ¹ that the panel ¯nding is reversed by an appellate
review. Consequently the appellate review procedure is likely to be evoked in a large
number of cases.
20The strictly legal function and expertise of the appellate body should ensure unity of interpretation of
international law and should rule out that the outcome of an appellate review depends on which country
appeals. Once one country appeals, it is virtually costless for the other country to appeal too.
15In fact, 24 out of 28 cases which have gone through the panel stage so far have
been consequently appealed.21 In 21 disputes an appellate review was requested by the
losing defendant, 22 in one by the losing complainant (DS22), and twice by one or both
contestants in disputes with ambiguous panel ¯ndings (DS69, DS70). Only four panel
reports | one in favor of the defendant (DS44),23 two in favor of the complainant (DS99,
DS126), one ambiguous (DS54/55/59/64) | were directly adopted.
The appellate review fully con¯rmed the ¯ndings of the panel report in 21 disputes.
In two cases the appeal led to a reversal of the panel ¯ndings (DS60, DS62/67/68), and
in one case to a partial reversion (DS103/113). A losing defendant obviously appeals
even if hopes to win the case are slim. In the latter three cases, the appellate review
seems to have ful¯lled its anticipated role.
In contrast to the model's prediction, the winning complainant appealed against
the ¯ndings of the panel report in two cases, the two minor textile cases of developing
countries against the US already mentioned above (DS24 and DS33). Costa Rica as well
as India appealed although the US had already announced its intention to conform with
the panel's ¯ndings. A closer inspection of the two cases reveals that the complainants
were not primarily interested in the substantive outcome of the review, but rather in legal
interpretations and clari¯cations of the panel's verdict. The reasoning of the appellate
review might have been used to ammunition the parties with (free) legal expertise for
future similar trade con°icts.
There is thus empirical support for our prediction that the losing party has an incen-
tive to appeal, in most cases in order to delay the implementation of a negative ruling.
Our analysis implies that the high propensity to appeal will not just be a transitory
phenomenon likely to disappear after participants have gained greater clarity about the
interpretation of WTO law. The decision to appeal is the result of the incentive structure
of the game, and is much less in°uenced by legal uncertainty. Nevertheless, legal aspects
during appellate review do play a role. In at least three cases the appellate review has
21The 28 considered cases comprise only completed disputes and exclude cases currently under appellate
review or within two months after the panel decision.
22Disputes DS2/4, DS8/10/11, DS16/27, DS18, DS26/48, DS31, DS46, DS50, DS56, DS58, DS60,
DS62/67/68, DS75/84, DS76, DS87/109/110, DS90, DS98, DS103/113, and DS121.
23DS44 is an interesting case: Although the trade con°ict was between the US and Japan o±cially,
the dispute was in fact between two companies (Kodak and Fuji) with no or only minor government
involvement. The US government lost the case because there was not su±cient government involvement
to defend a non{violation complaint. Nevertheless, the US was granted concessions by the Japanese
government in competition policy.
16acted as a safeguard against a legally wrong panel decision. The review's legal exper-
tise can also be valuable for winning complainants because it constitutes important and
costless information for future cases.
4.3 Complainant's strategy (noti¯cation and panel request)
After the introduction of a potential trade restriction, the complainant can initiate all
moves until a ¯rst decision is made by the WTO panel. Its optimal strategy in view of
the anticipated reaction of the defendant can be summarized by the following predictions:
Prediction 3a (panel request) : The complainant always requests the panel at the
earliest possible date.
Prediction 3b (¯ling decision): The probability ¼ to win the trial has to exceed a










A nuisance suit (¼ = 0) is only optimal if the domestic political gain on an appeal
after a negative panel decision o®sets both the international reputation loss of losing
the case and the direct process cost (RC
app ¸ RC
lose + KC).
Prediction 3c (noti¯cation): For ¼ ¸ ¼, the complainant noti¯es WTO at the earliest
possible date.
Proof: 3a and 3c are obvious, because any delay reduces expected payo®s.
Condition (3) in 3b can be derived from the condition that the complainant's expected
payo® in the pre{panel stage has to be greater than the reservation payo® without a
complaint (¡lt ¡ ~ L, see payo® (A2) in Appendix A.2).
Note that condition (3) hinges crucially on the fact that the complainant can force a
decision (and attain RC
win), and that the losing defendant complies after the reasonable
period ¿. In case the latter requirement is not satis¯ed ~ L has to be replaced by (1¡°)~ L
where ° ¸ 0 captures the probability of non{compliance or any additional delays in
implementation. This allows an interesting comparison between the dispute settlement
under GATT and WTO. The required con¯dence level ¼ depends negatively on both the
strength of the implementation mechanism (as measured by (1¡°)), and the possibility
to reach a favorable decision (and therefore get RC
win). Both components were certainly
17weaker in expected terms under the GATT system (due to blocking of decisions and the
absence of an e®ective implementation procedure) than under the WTO mechanism. It
is therefore not surprising that the new dispute settlement system has led to a substantial
increase in complaints.
The agenda{setting capacity of the complainant, moreover, should lead to a relatively
tight schedule of the dispute settlement system. In most instances, the complainant will
not ¯le a suit until his chances to win the case are su±ciently high. Nuisance suits cannot
be completely excluded in situations in which domestic pressure to sue has a much higher
impact on the political support than an expected loss.
In support of prediction 3a, Table 2 shows the distribution of waiting times between
noti¯cation and panel request (74 cases). The data show a peak at time periods between
60 (the legal minimum) and 90 days, but also a considerable dispersion. Note that many
cases are delayed due to bundling of panel requests for related cases or to holidays. Wait-
ing times below 60 days represent disputes in which the complainant could prove to have
noti¯ed the defendant in an acceptable way outside the o±cial procedure. Preliminary
evidence suggests that multi{complainant settings lead to longer waiting time between
noti¯cation and panel request, presumably due to coordination problems.
Unfortunately, empirical support for the complainant's ¯ling decision and hence on
prediction 3b is only indirect. For completed cases there is no evidence of nuisance suits.
Among the 44 panel decisions, only two were entirely in favor of the defendant. In both
cases (DS22 and DS44) the complainant \lost" because WTO law was not applicable
to the trade measure in question. Two other cases led to verdicts in favor of the de-
fendant only after a reversal of the panel's ¯ndings by the appellate review (DS60 and
DS62/67/68), which means that the cases were far from being clear{cut ex ante. The
same is true for four cases with an ambiguous verdict. The remaining 38 cases ended
with clear decisions in favor of the complainant.
In the vast majority of cases, the initiation of the trade restriction is unknown. Predic-
tion 3c is thus not directly veri¯able. Moreover, the substantial changes in the structure
of the dispute settlement mechanism might have led to a back log and clustering of cases,
which complicates the analysis even if the onset of a trade restriction were known.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Table 2 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
184.4 Introduction of a new trade measure
Given the parties strategies during litigation, does the dispute settlement system discour-
age the introduction of new trade restrictions? Trade related payo®s for the defending
country accrue with certainty during the whole process. Positive expected payo®s are
therefore feasible even for a very small probability 1 ¡ ¼ of being able to maintain the
trade measure after the conclusion of the dispute. The defendant's optimal strategy can
be stated as follows:
Prediction 4 (new trade restriction): The future defendant introduces a trade mea-
sure if
(1 ¡¼) ~ G+ gt +¼(RD
app ¡RD
lose) +(1 ¡¼)RD
win ¡KD ¸ 0:
When ¼ = 1 (i.e. when both parties are certain of panel ¯nding in favor of com-
plainant), the condition for the introduction of a trade restriction is gt + RD
app ¸
RD
lose + KD: The future defendant will introduce the trade restriction, if rents an-
ticipated to accrue during the whole process plus reputation gains from satisfying
domestic interest groups exceed the expected reputation loss of a lost trial plus direct
process costs.
Proof: Follows directly from the defendant's expected payo® (A1), given in Appendix A.
If domestic pressure to introduce and maintain a trade restriction is larger than (inter-
national) reputation losses plus litigation costs, the dispute settlement system cannot
prevent a welfare decreasing policy. If we allow for the possibility that non{compliance
is the optimal strategy, incentives for introducing trade restrictive measures are stronger
yet, even if the probability of losing is one. The agenda{setting capacity of the com-
plainant together with the elimination of blocking should limit the potential direct gains
of the trade restriction (as measured by gt) during WTO litigation. The possibility of
appeal, on the other hand, provides the losing defendant with a potential (domestic) rep-
utation gain. If the former e®ect dominates, the number of new trade distortions should
decrease compared to GATT.
Of course, direct empirical evidence of our prediction is not available, as the motives of
trade policy measures are not veri¯able. Potential gains from a trade restriction accruing
during the litigation process are most likely to be anticipated, however. In the recent
Foreign Sales Cooperation con°ict between the US and the EU (DS108) with an a®ected
19trade volume of several billion dollars, gains due to the delay in the procedure and the
absence of retaliation measures before the end of a reasonable implementation period
have even been advertised.24
4.5 The scope for bilateral settlements
Bilateral settlements between the two parties are feasible if they provide a higher expected
payo® for both countries than a continuation of the formal litigation process. The refusal
of either party to accept an informal solution su±ces to continue the formal dispute settle-
ment procedures. The non{cooperative game without intermediate bargaining, therefore,
constitutes a lower bound | and thus the threat point | for both parties' expected
payo®s at every stage of the formal dispute settlement system. By a mutual agreement,
the parties forego potential future reputation gains and losses, but save litigation costs
at early stages. In addition, direct trade gains and losses are reduced in relation to the
litigation time saved.
Pecuniary compensation payments between two countries are rather uncommon (but
not excluded, e.g. in the form of additional development assistance). Therefore, bilateral
settlements will very likely result in a compromise on the trade measure in question. This
can also entail that the complainant is granted the right to some compensating trade
restrictions. In order to avoid arbitrary assumptions about the nature of the bargaining
between the two countries and its possible outcomes, we merely consider the polar cases
\trade restriction maintained" and \trade restriction suspended" (see Appendix A.3 for
the respective payo®s). For each possible settlement period we compute the sum of
payo®s for both polar cases as a proxy for the cooperative value of the settlement. In
an analogous way, the players' payo®s from completing the formal dispute settlement
procedure are computed as a proxy for the non{cooperative value of the game.25
Bilateral settlements can be expected to be less clear cut in favor of either party than
decisions by the WTO{DSB. The retreating party (either the defendant abolishing the
24PricewaterhouseCoopers Tax News Network, for example, states in February 1999: \Because WTO{
ordered change in the FSC regime would be prospective in application, and would not likely be e®ective
until 2001, it may still be worthwhile to set up a FSC if the start{up costs can be recouped in about one
year or less."
25If payo®s were pecuniary, a nonstrategic bargaining model would assume that disputes will always be
settled informally when the cooperative value is perceived to be greater than the non{cooperative value
of the game, whereas disputes will ¯nally be decided by the WTO, when the former is perceived to be
smaller. Although a direct application of this rule is not possible in our much more complex situation,
we hopefully still get some information from such exercise.
20trade restriction or the complainant giving up the complaint) has to be compensated for
potential reputation payo®s, and for the probability that he might have won the case after
all. Is the expected panel decision unclear (i.e. 0 < ¼ < 1), the country with the larger
absolute gain or loss will have an advantage in bilateral settlements as it is more di±cult
for its opponent to o®er su±cient compensation in order to retain its previous position.
For the two polar cases ¼ = 0 and ¼ = 1, only the forgone net (political) reputation gains
have to be considered. This is also true after the conclusion of the interim report when
the position of the WTO is relatively clear.
Prediction 5a: Bilateral settlements are biased towards the expected outcome of the
formal dispute settlement procedure for values of ¼ close to 1 or 0, and especially
so after the conclusion of the interim report.
For intermediate values of ¼, the cooperative value of the game is largely dominated
by the relative size of the trade related continuation gains and losses ~ G and ~ L. A
mutual agreement is biased towards the country with the higher absolute gain or
loss.
Proof: The claim can be derived by comparing cooperative and non{cooperative values
of the game (as stated in Appendix A.3).
An additional variable of interest is the timing of bilateral settlements. In the absence
of shocks to the probability and cost structure, there are three windows for bilateral
settlements: Between noti¯cation and the establishment of a panel, during the panel
stage (when both parties experience direct process costs KD and KC), but before the
completion of the interim report, and ¯nally between the interim report (when most
uncertainty is resolved) and the circulation of the ¯nal panel report. Note that although
interim and panel reports hardly ever di®er, there are notable di®erences in payo®s be-
tween the two stages, because some reputation costs and gains are only relevant when
the DSB's ¯ndings become public knowledge, i.e. after the conclusion of the panel report.
The parties can still settle at this point as the content of the interim report is kept con¯-
dential. As we have shown above, a potential mutual agreement after the interim report




win, the more probable is a bilateral settlement at this point. A
complainant with a minor (reputation) stake in case of victory will agree to terminate
the case at this point in time, in exchange for a su±cient reduction or suspension of the
21trade measure.26 After the panel report has been circulated among the WTO{members,
there is little scope for a bilateral settlement any more. The implementation of the
panel's ¯ndings is closely monitored by the DSB. Predications 5b and 5c summarize the
likelihood of mutual agreements at di®erent stages of the dispute:
Prediction 5b: The larger RD
lose ¡ RD
app ¡ RC
win, the more likely a bilateral settlement
after the conclusion of an interim report, but before the circulation of the panel
report. (Ruling in favor of the complainant)
Prediction 5c: Mutually agreed solutions are more likely at an early stage of the process,
in particular before the complainant is granted a panel.




win, while the cooperative values are constant. Claim 5c follows from
the fact that before the panel stage, the avoidance of litigation costs KC and KD can
favor a bilateral settlement.
The appearance of new information and the joining of third parties can change payo®
components, above all direct process costs KC;D and the probability ¼ of success of a
complaint. Their impact on the likelihood of bilateral settlements can be summarized as
follows:
Prediction 5d: The likelihood of a bilateral settlement
² increases in ¼ if the defendant's net payo® loss from losing the case (RD
lose ¡
RD
app) is su±ciently high.
² decreases in ¼ if the complainant's payo® gain from wining the suit is su±-
ciently high.
² increases in direct litigation costs KC and KD .
Proof: The claim follows from a comparison of cooperative and non{cooperative values
of the game. It is also illustrated below.
Let us assume that trade related payo®s of the disputed restriction are perceived as being
26Petersmann (1997) argues that the willingness of developing countries to terminate panel proceedings
at this stage might re°ect the relatively low gain from winning the case R
C
win, such that their gain from
a bilateral settlement is much larger. However, under the new WTO dispute settlement system only a
single case could be observed so far.
22symmetric, i.e. ~ G = ~ L and g = l. Then the non{cooperative value of the game is







which can be greater or smaller than zero, depending on the payo® components. A
situation in which previously ©C + ©D ¸ 0 can suddenly open up room for a bilateral
settlement in various cases: The costs of undergoing the formal procedure may increase
for the defendant if third parties enter in favor of the complainant (KD increases). An







win is positive/negative. Bilateral settlements
become more likely if the defendant's payo® loss from losing the case is high, and less
likely if the complainant's payo® gain from wining the suit is high.
Although many cases that are settled bilaterally do not enter o±cial records, at least
29 cases (seem to) have been settled without recourse to the formal procedure. In support
of our prediction, a majority of 24 cases have been settled after noti¯cation but before
the establishment of the panel. In ¯ve of these cases, the complainant requested a panel
before a mutual agreement could be reached. Four settlements could be observed after
the establishment of the panel, but before a ¯rst decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body. Only one of the disputes ended in a mutual agreement right after the conclusion
of the interim report which prevented circulation of the panel report | and consequently
the disclosure of its ¯ndings.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Table 3 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 Summary and conclusions
Based on the analysis of the di®erent stages of the WTO dispute settlement system,
we can now answer the questions formulated in the introduction and try to draw some
conclusions for possible improvements of an international dispute settlement system.
First, the preventive power of the WTO dispute settlement system is too limited
to discourage new trade restrictions. Even if the probability of winning a case is slim,
countries have an incentive to introduce trade restrictions, as rents continue to accrue
during the litigation process, and sanctions or compensations for past damages do not
exist. On the other hand, the likelihood of a nuisance suit against a well behaved country
is rather small. A complaint is only ¯led if the probability of winning is su±ciently high.
23Second, there is a strong tendency for the losing government to appeal against the
panel decision, even if the chances of a revision are slim. An appeal delays the imple-
mentation of negative ¯ndings and suits the interests of domestic groups. This obviously
has consequences for the way the parties perceive the dispute settlement process, as they
plan for an appeal right from the start.27 The appellate review's legal expertise might
be used even by winning complainants with a view to accumulate arguments for future
disputes on similar issues.
Third, the implementation stage, together with the absence of sanctions for damages
during litigation, are the weakest elements of the new dispute settlement system. In case
of a panel/appellate review decision in favor of the complainant, the defendant has strong
incentives to delay implementation. Unless reputation losses of non{conforming are su±-
ciently high, the limited threats of compensation payments or retaliation measures fail to
provide the loser country's with an incentive to implement the panel's recommendations
quickly.
Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely to be observed at an early stage of the
litigation process. In clear{cut cases, the results of bilateral settlements should be similar
to the expected ruling of the DSB. The losing party can avoid reputation losses (often
at the price of giving up its position immediately) by agreeing upon a mutually accepted
solution. Changes in the expected outcome of the process and in payo® elements, in
particular by joining third parties, have an impact on the scope for bilateral settlement.
Compared to the GATT mechanism, the new dispute settlement system is more
e®ective, though. WTO decisions cannot be blocked by a single country, which limits the
(political) gains from trade distortions. The relatively tight schedule of the new dispute
settlement system (the complainant has control over many timing decisions) reduces the
gains and losses of ine±cient trade measures by limiting the period during which they
are e®ective. This impact is twofold: It leads to a reduction in the threshold level to
sue, and consequently triggers a higher number of justi¯ed complaints. On the other
hand, trade distortions may now prove non{pro¯table due to the limited time they can
be active, which may reduce the number of potential complaints.
Some features of the new dispute settlement mechanism are well designed while others
27As Petersmann (1997) points out, this could | especially in the long run | weaken the authority
of ¯rst{instance panel reports. According to Petersmann (page 188), the strong tendency to appeal an
unfavorable panel decision \might even lead to the view that governments be granted the right of direct
access to the quasi{judicial appellate body rather than be obliged, without exception, to undergo the time
and e®ort of a preliminary panel procedure prior to the ¯nal appellate body report."
24are not. The complainant's agenda{setting capacity obviously limits the time a trade
restriction can remain active. This is, however, partially o®set by the weak enforcement
mechanism during the implementation stage. Moreover, the lack of e®ective sanctions
for non{compliance with WTO law further weakens the threat of the system, unless
non{conforming countries experience sizeable reputation losses. Nevertheless, the great
number of dispute settlement cases so far should rather be interpreted as a signal of
con¯dence into the new litigation process, than as a failure of the WTO's aim to maintain
an internationally liberal trade regime.
25A Payo®s
In this appendix we keep track of all the payo®s of the game. Note that payo®s ©C
and ©D are always understood as (expected) payo®s and are computed from the time
the decision is made. Subscripts mark the stage of the dispute settlement process at the
relevant decision nodes.
A.1 Appellate review
Depending on the outcome of the panel report, the expected payo®s for complainant and
defendant undergoing appellate review are as follows:
©D
[appjpanel=C] = ¹ ~ G +g(timpl + tapp) +RD
app ¸ gtimpl = ©D
[no¡appjpanel=C]
©D
[appjpanel=D] = (1 ¡ º) ~ G +g(timpl + tapp) ￿ ~ G +g(timpl + tapp) = ©D
[no¡appjpanel=D]
©C
[appjpanel=D] = ¡(1 ¡ º)~ L ¡l(timpl + tapp) + RC
app ¸ ¡~ L ¡l(timpl + tapp) = ©C
[no¡appjpanel=D]
©C
[appjpanel=C] = ¡¹~ L ¡l(timpl + tapp) ￿ ¡ltimpl = ©C
[no¡appjpanel=C]
Note that in computing these payo®s we suppose that the losing defendant complies after
timpl (= ¿).
A.2 Pre{panel stages
Note that t denotes the expected time until the end of the litigation process. The defen-















= ¼¹ ~ G ¡¼RD
lose + ¼RD
app +(1 ¡¼)(1 ¡ º) ~ G+ (1¡ ¼)RD
win +gt ¡KD
= (1¡ ¼) ~ G +gt+ ¼(RD
app ¡ RD
lose) + (1 ¡ ¼)RD
win ¡ KD: (A1)
The last equality follows from our restricting assumption about revision probabilities in















= ¡¼¹~ L + ¼RC
win ¡(1 ¡¼)(1 ¡ º)~ L +(1 ¡¼)RC
app ¡(1 ¡¼)RC
lose ¡ lt ¡KC
= ¡(1 ¡¼)~ L ¡lt+ (1 ¡¼)(RC
app ¡RC
lose) +¼RC
win ¡ KC: (A2)
From payo® (A2) the minimum level ¼ to ¯le can be computed from the condition
©C
pre¡panel ¸ ¡~ L ¡lt (the reservation utility without complaint).
26A.3 Bilateral settlements
The threat point and consequently the non{cooperative value of the game is the sum
of the expected payo®s of the reference scenario without bilateral settlements. We also
consider the two polar cases \trade restriction maintained" (denoted by a + sign) and
\trade restriction suspended" (denoted by a ¡ sign).
After the interim report, the non{cooperative values of the game (conditional on
which country has won in the interim report) and the two polar outcomes (as cooperative
values) are as follows:








©C;¡ + ©D;¡ = 0
©C;+ + ©D;+ = ( ~ G ¡ ~ L) +t(g ¡l)
Before interim report, the threat point, and the two polar cooperative outcomes are:








©C;¡ +©D;¡ = 0
©C;+ +©D;+ = ( ~ G¡ ~ L) +t(g ¡l)
Assume that the disputed trade measure is perceived as a zero game in trade related
rents from both parties views, i.e. ~ G = ~ L and g = l. Then the non{cooperative value of
the game is






win)¡ KD ¡KC: (A3)
B United States | Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, complaint by Venezuela (DS 2)
On January 23, 1995, Venezuela requested consultations with the US concerning Stan-
dards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. The dispute related to a US domestic
legislation called the \Clean Air Act of 1990", and especially to the \Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline" enacted
by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency. This regulation was enacted to
27control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in
or imported into the US.
Consultations were held between Venezuela and the US on February 24, 1995, but
the parties failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. Consequently, Venezuela
requested the establishment of a panel on March 25, 1995 (61 days after noti¯cation of
WTO). On April 10, 1995, the Dispute Settlement Body (\DSB") established a panel.
At the same time also Brazil requested consultations with the US concerning the same
facts, and | after their failure | required the establishment of a panel (reference DS
4). The DSB decided that the case was to be taken over by the previously established
panel for Venezuela.
On January 17, 1996, the panel report was circulated among WTO members. The
DSB followed the arguments of the complainants. On February 21, 1996, the US noti¯ed
the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the
panel report. The report of the appellate review was circulated among WTO members
on May 20, 1996. The appellate body upheld the ¯ndings of the panel/DSB. The US
was granted a standard implementation period of 15 months. Approximately 17 months
later, on October 17, 1997, the United States informed the WTO of its compliance with
the requirements of the DSB.
C Data
The database has been prepared by and is available from Monika BÄ utler upon request.
Table 4 contains cases mentioned explicitly in this paper. They are numbered by their
o±cial WTO label. Additional information, including panel and appellate review reports,
can also be found on the WTO's webpage (www.wto.org/wto/dispute).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Place Table 4 here
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
28References
Cooter, Robert D., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, (1989). \Economic Analysis of Legal Dis-
putes and Their Resolution", Journal of Economic Literature, 27(3): 1067{1097.
Croley, Steven P., and John H. Jackson, (1995). \The WTO Dispute Procedures, Stan-
dard of Review, and Deference to National Governments", American Journal of Inter-
national Law, 193{213.
Hudec, R.E., and D.L.M. Kennedy, and M. Sgarbossa, (1993). \A Statistical Pro¯le of
GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948{89", Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, 2(1):
1{113.
Jackson, John H. (1998). \Designing and Implementing E®ective Dispute Settlement
Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects", in The WTO as an
International Organization, edited by Anne O. Krueger, The University of Chicago Press,
193{213.
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, (1997). The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: Inter-
national Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, London, The Hague, Boston.
Shell, Richard G. (1995). \Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Anal-
ysis of the World Trade Organization", Duke Law Journal, 44 (5): 829{927.
Vermulst, Edwin, and Bart Driessen, (1995). \An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements: Nice on Paper
but Too Much Stress for the System?", Journal of World Trade, 29 (2): 131{162.
WTO, (1995). The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, WTO, Geneva.panel stage
implementation stage (only if report is in favour of country C)
country D takes action (trade restriction, etc)
country C noti¯es WTO of consultations
country C requests panel
panel established
end of panel stage
interim report
panel report




country D does not implement
negotiation on compensations






















































































































































































































































































Figure 2: WTO Dispute Settlement System: Game tree (without implementation stage).
Filled dots denote ¯nal nodes for which (expected) payo®s are known, circles denote ¯nal
nodes corresponding to bilateral settlements, for which payo®s are not a priori known.
Probabilities are given in square brackets.Description Parameter
Trade rel. gains/losses: Loss of complainant (rate, per year) l ¸ 0
Continuation loss of complainant ~ L ¸ 0
Gain of defendant (rate, per year) g
Continuation gain of defendant ~ G
Compensation loss, defendant (per year) pD
Reputation gains/losses: Loss of losing panel RC
lose, RD
lose
Gain from wining panel RC
win, RD
win
Gain from undergoing appellate review RC
app, RD
app
Loss of not conforming RD
impl[t]
Litigation costs: Direct costs (lawyers, etc) KC, KD
Probabilities: Panel in favour of complainant ¼
Revision by appellate review (panel = complainant) ¹
Revision by appellate review (panel = defendant) º
Table 1: Payo® elements for both players and probabilities of WTO decisions.
tnotif!panel 0{59 60{89 90{119 120{149 150{179 180{269 270{360 more
cases 6 25 10 7 7 9 4 7
Table 2: Distribution of waiting times between noti¯cation and panel request.Stage: 1 2 3 4 4a 5 6 cases
Move by: D C C WTO D C WTO
inter. panel
I { { { { { { { NA
II action { { { { { { NA
III action notif. panel C app. C 19¤
IV action notif. panel C app. D 2
V action notif. panel D app. D 1
VI action notif. panel D app. C 0
other 6
BS1 action BS { { { { { NA
BS2 action notif. BS { { { { 24
BS3 action notif. panel BS { { { 4
BS4 action notif. panel ? BS { { { 1
Table 3: Subgame{perfect equilibria of the WTO dispute settlement game: The upper
part of the table lists equilibria without an intermediate bilateral settlement and without
major random changes to the payo® structure during litigation (¤ includes two cases
in which an appellate review was requested by the winning country). The lower part
lists cases, in which a bilateral settlement (BS) can be a possible equilibrium outcome.
Only clear empirical cases have been classi¯ed. (BS = bilateral settlement, NA = no
information available)DS{No Defend. Complain. Disputed matter
2,4 US Venezuela,
Brazil










Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas
18 Australia Canada Measures A®ecting the Importation of Salmon
22 Brazil Philippines Measures A®ecting Desiccated Coconut
24 US Costa Rica Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fi-
bre Underwear
26,48 EU US, Canada Measures A®ecting Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones)
31 Canada US Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals
33 US India Measure A®ecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses
44 Japan US Measures A®ecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper
46 Brazil Canada Export Financing Programme for Aircraft
50 India US Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products
54,55,59,64 Indonesia EU, Japan,
US
Certain Measures A®ecting the Automobile Industry
56 Argentina US Certain Measures A®ecting Imports of Footwear, Tex-
tiles, Apparel and Other Items
58 US India Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products




US Customs Classi¯cation of Certain Computer Equip-
ment
69 EU Brazil Measures A®ecting Importation of Certain Poultry
Products
70 Canada Brazil Measures A®ecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
75, 84 Korea EU, US Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
76 Japan US Measures A®ecting Agricultural Products
87,109,110 Chile EU Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
90 India US Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products
98 Korea EU De¯nitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products
99 US Korea Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit
or Above
103,113 Canada US, NZ Measures A®ecting the Importation of Milk and the
Exportation of Dairy Products
108 US EU Tax Treatment for \Foreign Sales Corporations"
121 Argentina EU Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear
126 Australia US Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Au-
tomotive Leather
Table 4: WTO dispute settlement: Cases mentioned in the text.